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Abstract
In this paper, I question the relations between ‹universal› knowledge pro-
duced by the scientific community and the local or specific knowledge of 
citizens, concerned groups, or society at large. I ask how science—and 
technology—can contribute to what I consider a major universal value: 
democracy. Starting our journey with the ‹experimental life› emerging in 
the seventeenth century with the invention of the laboratory, I then describe 
the standard norms that are supposed to produce the ‹scientific ethos›. I 
discuss some recent transformations of the relationship between science 
and society, as well as the conceptions and tools the actors have used during 
the last thirty years in order to deal with these issues. Briefly, these 
 conceptions have gone from better communication to knowledge co-pro-
duction. I conclude by presenting some contemporary challenges the aca-
demic community has to face in order to maintain science as a common 
good and to reinforce democracy.
1. Foreword—from where am I speaking?
This paper is a mixture of theoretical and empirical elements based on my 
current research and on my daily work in the field of public engagement 
with science. It is also based on my involvement in the domain of participa-
tory technology assessment (pTA) as an expert for the Swiss Centre for 
Technology Assessment (TA-SWISS)1 and as the Swiss partner of the Euro-
pean project Citizen Participation in Science and Technology (CIPAST)2.
I first studied and practiced biology, then sociology. My specialisation is 
in the field of sociology of science, more often called Social Studies of 
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 Science, or STS, in the academic world. For six years, I have been head of 
a department called the Science-Society Interface3 at the University of 
Lausanne, which is in charge of fostering dialogue between science and the 
public. For us, ‹science› includes the natural sciences as well as the social 
sciences and the humanities. ‹The public› means the ‹average citizen›, 
school pupils, as well as concerned groups like patient organisations or 
NGOs.
We use many different forms of collaboration and other means in order 
to achieve our goals: forums, workshops, scientific cafés, conferences, ex-
hibitions, continuous training, and interdisciplinary research. Three years 
ago, we created a public laboratory called «L’Eprouvette» (The Test Tube), 
where thousands of people have come every year to experiment on their 
own and discuss the issues of molecular biology, neuroscience or animal 
behaviour.
2. Introduction—science4 and the universal
In this paper, I will discuss the question of how ‹universal› knowledge 
produced by the scientific community can be linked with the local or spe-
cific knowledge of citizens, concerned groups, or society at large. In other 
words, how science—and technology—can contribute to what I consider 
to be a major universal value: democracy.
It is quite common to think of the scientific revolution that took place in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as the advent of a new kind of uni-
versality: a universality stemming from the power of mathematics and the 
invention of the ‹modern› laboratory where undisputed facts can be pro-
duced and reproduced under the gaze of scientific peers. Two historical 
figures exemplify this major transformation: Galileo Galilei in Italy and 
Robert Boyle in England.
2.1. Experimental life and the emerging scientific ethos
In their major book Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the 
Experimental Life, Steve Shapin and Simon Schaffer describe how experi-
mental philosophers around 1650 invented a new way of producing truth 
using the laboratory setting:
Boyle proposed that matters of fact be established by the aggregation of individuals’ 
beliefs. Members of an intellectual collective had mutually to assure themselves and 
others that belief in an empirical experience was warranted. […] If that experience 
could be extended to many, and in principle to all men, then the result could be consti-
tuted as a matter of fact. In this way, the matter of fact is to be seen as both an episte-
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mological and a social category. The foundational item of experimental knowledge, 
and of what counted as properly grounded knowledge generally, was an artifact of 
communication and whatever social forms were deemed necessary to sustain and en-
hance communication. […] The establishment of matters of fact in Boyle’s experi-
mental programme utilized three technologies: a material technology embedded in the 
construction and operation of the air-pump; a literary technology by means of which 
the phenomena produced by the pump were made known to those who were not direct 
witnesses; and a social technology that incorporated the conventions experimental 
philosophers should use in dealing with each other and considering knowledge-
claims.
Shapin/ Schaffer 1985, p. 25
This configuration of practices, the «experimental life», can still be ob-
served in the contemporary scientific ethos. Of course, a lot of transforma-
tions have occurred since the launch of the ancestor of modern scientific 
journals, The Philosophical Transactions, by the British Royal Society in 
1665. For example, you do not have to qualify as a gentleman anymore in 
order to enter the scientific community. The emerging modern laboratory 
was conceived by Boyle and his colleagues as a machine to produce a uni-
versal consensus about facts; it also offered a model for society as a whole 
for pacifying political, theological and philosophical conflicts among reli-
gious factions or for resolving disputes resulting from other knowledge 
production practices of the time like alchemy. According to this new ap-
proach to nature, the use of the laboratory allows to distinguish facts from 
values, science from mere opinions.
2.2. The Mertonian vision of science
Within modernity, a link between the scientific ethos and universality can 
be found in the famous paper published by Robert K. Merton in 1942 en-
titled The Normative Structure of Science, re-issued in 1973 in an anthol-
ogy of the work of this famous American sociologist (Merton 1973). In this 
text, Merton defines the four norms of scientific practice. Norms are insti-
tutional imperatives which reward the members of a community who fol-
low them and sanction those who violate them. For any norm, we can sym-
metrically define an anti-norm.
Merton called the first norm disinterestedness (vs. interestedness), which 
demands scientists to disengage their interests from their actions and judg-
ments. They must report results fully, no matter what theory those results 
support. Disinterestedness must rule out fraud, such as reporting fabricated 
data; so, according to this principle, fraud should be rare in science. The 
second one is organised scepticism (vs. dogmatism), which means that the 
scientific community tends to disbelieve new ideas until they have been 
well established. It is implemented at two levels: direct and public ques-
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tioning of the proponent, and reserved judgment on new claims, accompa-
nied by attempts to duplicate experiments. So, it encompasses the famous 
«falsification criteria» established by Karl Popper to separate scientific 
claims from other practices asking for legitimacy, like psychoanalysis.
Then comes the norm of communism or communalism (vs. individual-
ism). Knowledge—the central product of science—is commonly owned. 
Results should be publicised in order to allow scientific achievements to be 
produced cumulatively; science is a social and public activity, which again 
tends to ensure infrequency of fraud. Finally, there is the norm of univer-
salism (vs. particularism), which states that the criteria used to evaluate a 
scientific claim do not depend upon the identity of the person making the 
claim, be it race, nationality, religion, class, sex, or other personal qualities. 
These criteria stress the impersonal character of scientific laws.
Even though the Mertonian vision of scientific practice has been widely 
criticised, especially by the ‹new› sociology of science, which has devel-
oped since the 1970s, it nevertheless represents an inescapable reference 
point in the debate on the scientific ethos and the infringements it may be 
subject to. Observers of the dynamics of science have demonstrated that 
those norms are no more than an ideal-type, or as some would say, a myth. 
The growing interest in and deontological reflection about scientific mis-
conduct and means to detect and sanction it stand at the centre of this prob-
lem. As far as the norm of universality is concerned, empirical studies have 
shown, for example, that scientific journals and their peer review system 
do not consider claims made by researchers of different status or age in the 
same way.
2.3. Public Understanding of Science: the «deficit model»
Since science presents itself as a universal quest for hard facts and truth, it 
must also demonstrate, as a consequence, that any individual, whatever its 
social status and profession, must be able to understand and accept its re-
sults. This conception can be traced back from the eighteenth century 
through the Enlightenment and the nineteenth century, as the golden age of 
progress, to our present time. The nineteenth century was characterised by 
a major expansion in the popularisation of science. In the social contract 
established between science and society, a great deal of autonomy was con-
ceded to the former in exchange for economic prosperity, which was sup-
posed to flow out of technological innovation. The advancement of science 
was to automatically translate into progress via technology. As soon as the 
notion of progress began to be contested in the second part of the twentieth 
century, mainly triggered by the unfolding environmental crisis and the 
advent of the so-called «risk society» (Beck 1992), the institutions in charge 
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of producing scientific knowledge tried to develop strategies to contain 
emerging distrust in the ‹universal› virtues of science and progress, which 
was viewed to pose a threat to national prosperity.
The most systematic effort to that effect has probably been the Public 
Understanding of Science (PUS) approach by The Royal Society in the 
UK. It is an exemplary response from the scientific institutions to what has 
been interpreted as a growing ‹gap› between science and society, which 
was first documented by surveys and reports in the 1980s. In their well-
known and widely disseminated document published in 1985, The Royal 
Society states:
A basic thesis of this report is that the better public understanding of science can be a 
major element in promoting national prosperity, in raising the quality of public and 
private decision-making and in enriching the life of the individual. […] Improving the 
public understanding of science is an investment in the future, not a luxury to be in-
dulged in if and when resources allow.
The Royal Society 1985, p. 9
Here is a list of some of the main benefits expected from PUS:
•	 to	facilitate	national	prosperity	(competent	decision-makers	and	skilled	
manpower);
•	 to	reduce	hostility	and	indifference	to	S&T;
•	 to	favour	adequate	personal	and	‹lifestyle›	decisions	(diet,	smoking,	vac-
cination, safety at home and at work, etc.);
•	 to	help	people	resist	pseudo-scientific	information	(alternative	medicine,	
beliefs in pseudo-sciences);
•	 to	improve	understanding	of	the	technologies	used	in	everyday	life;
•	 to	enhance	understanding	of	the	nature	of	risks,	uncertainties	and	prob-
abilities, to ensure more rational behaviour (averting demands for a ‹zero 
risk› society and increasing acceptance of technical options, such as vac-
cination, nuclear power stations, seat belts in cars, medical screening, 
etc.);
•	 to	facilitate	cultural	assimilation	of	scientific	findings	(evolutionary	bi-
ology, cosmology).
To achieve those goals, PUS promoters recommend many changes in the 
domains of education, political institutions, the media, industry and the 
scientific community. To assess the level of ‹scientific literacy› of the pop-
ulation, according to its proponents, PUS should ask the social sciences to 
conduct surveys on a regular basis. In this construct, an undifferentiated 
entity called ‹the public› has to be educated and informed to create a more 
favourable environment in support of innovation and to reduce social resis-
tance to technology. A detailed critique of this asymmetrical vision of the 
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relationship between science and society has been developed in the UK at 
the «Lancaster School», led by researchers like Bryan Wynne (Irwin/ 
Wynne 1996). They aptly sum up their view of PUS by qualifying it as a 
«deficit model», in which laypeople are conceived as passive receptors of 
information to whom the institutions—be they universities, research cen-
tres, mass media, museums or schools—are supposed to provide educa-
tion.
Any rigorous attempt to tackle the complex issue of the relationship be-
tween science and the public should ask the following questions, which are 
taken for granted by the PUS approach: What constitutes the public we are 
talking about? What do people mean by ‹science›? What do we mean by 
‹understanding›? Those questions must be subjected to thorough empirical 
investigation, and answers should not be merely based on assumptions 
made by decision-makers and communicators. At the same time, these 
questions raise complex sociological, political and ethical issues. As Irwin 
and Wynne (1996) propose, a more symmetrical perspective would, for 
example, simultaneously investigate the Publics’ Understanding of Sci-
ences and Scientists’ Understanding of the Publics. What do people mean 
by ‹science› and ‹scientific expertise›? To whom do they turn to get techni-
cal information and advice? What motivates them to do so? How do they 
select, evaluate and use scientific information? How do they relate expert 
advice to their everyday experience and to other forms of knowledge?
If science can indeed be considered as a common good, those different 
critiques are of major interest to the issue raised in this paper concerning 
the contribution of science to the universal value of democracy.
3. Public engagement with science and the plurality of knowledge
It is common nowadays to speak of a deliberative or participatory turn 
(Blondiaux/ Sintomer 2002) in science and technology, or to invoke a move 
towards public engagement in science and technology policy. This situa-
tion is itself the result of a complex process involving a changing percep-
tion of the ability of representative democracy to address scientific and 
technological issues. The role of experts and decision-makers in the envi-
ronmental crisis and in risk assessment and management has raised many 
controversies. In this context, the controversy about GM crops and food 
has been a major turning point, since it has provided a frame of reference 
for both public and private actors; a kind of ‹worst case› to be avoided for 
the next technologies to come. Learning from the GMOs controversy and 
moving towards an ‹upstream engagement› with society becomes a master 
narrative of current public policies. This rhetoric plays a key role in the 
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way private companies and public actors conceive for instance the devel-
opment of nanotechnology.
The irruption of ‹concerned groups› producing counter-expertise in the 
domains of environment and biomedical sciences has also played a critical 
role in promoting a kind of «scientific citizenship» (Rose/ Novas 2005). It 
sometimes involves knowledge ‹co-production› in which scientists, ex-
perts, and laypeople collaborate closely to produce knowledge and solu-
tions to common problems (Callon 1999, Kleinman 2000, Leach et al. 
2007). In the Northern hemisphere, some striking and emblematic exam-
ples in this respect are the impact of patient organisations on the dynamics 
of AIDS research and treatment (Dodier 2003, Epstein 1996), activities of 
the French Muscular Dystrophy Association (Kaufmann 2004, Rabehari-
soa/ Callon 1999), and the French initiative CRIIRAD, which provides 
counter-expertise aimed at measuring nuclear radiation after the Chernobyl 
accident. In the South, many farmers’ organisations have for example 
brought their local practices and knowledge to bear in opposition against 
the introduction of GM crops, sometimes succeeding in stopping projects 
scheduled by local governments and private companies (Wakeford 2004).
The implementation of technology assessment (TA) can be viewed as a 
consequence of this multi-faceted process. It is useful to distinguish two 
kinds of TA (Hennen et al. 2004). On the one hand, there is ‹classical TA›, 
born in the United States and established in form of the well-known Office 
of Technology Assessment (OTA) (1972–1995). According to this version 
of TA, TA institutions are supposed to subject the issue at stake to scien-
tific analysis and deliver unbiased and comprehensive knowledge about 
the technical, legal, ethical and policy aspects to policy-makers. This kind 
of work can be seen as a peculiar type of expertise in which the final output 
is a written report. On the other hand, there is ‹public TA› or ‹participatory 
TA› (pTA), which emerged at the end of the 1980s and gave rise to the 
well-known consensus conferences developed by the Danish Board of 
Technology. Here, the process is not only expected to produce useful 
knowledge, but also to induce a communicative and participatory process 
in order to contribute to opinion formation by simulating a public sphere 
corresponding to a kind of Habermasian ideal.
3.1. Why public engagement?
Any attempt to discuss virtues and limits of public participation should 
start by presenting the arguments that justify public engagement as a 
worthwhile endeavour. According to Fiorino’s assessment of different in-
stitutional mechanisms of citizen participation in risk issues (Fiorino 
1990), three types of arguments are used to overcome the usual limita-
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tions of the technocratic approach to science and technology policy. The 
first is a substantive, or say an epistemic argument. It says that laypeople 
may produce knowledge and may identify solutions to problems comple-
menting expert knowledge. To put it in the language of the economists, 
participation is seen as a way to deal with the ‹limited rationality› of each 
type of actor involved. ‹Popular epidemiology› may be viewed as an em-
blematic case in this respect. Popular epidemiology «is a process by 
which laypersons gather scientific data and other information to direct 
and marshal the knowledge and resources of experts to understand the 
epidemiology of disease» (Brown/ Mikkelsen 1990, pp. 125–126). This 
argument corresponds to what Callon (1999) put under the umbrella of 
knowledge co-production.
Fiorino brings in a second argument, a normative one. It says that in a 
democratic regime citizens are the best judges of their own interests and 
must therefore be allowed to have a voice in technological or scientific 
decisions that can affect their lives or threaten their community. Fung 
(2006) uses similar arguments speaking of a criterion of justice close to the 
notion of empowerment.
A third argument can be qualified as instrumental. It relates to a loss of 
legitimacy of political decision-making. But this context of distrust towards 
politics and the political class is, at the same time, one of decrease of con-
cern and involvement of citizens in public affairs. The same point is made 
by Fung (2006) who also insists on legitimacy, yet also emphasises the 
criterion of effectiveness in the governance of public affairs.
3.2. Varieties of public engagement and hybrid forums
Smith (1983) defines public participation as a group of procedures de-
signed to consult, involve, and inform the public to allow those affected by 
a decision to have an input into that decision. In an attempt to establish a 
more precise definition of the concept of ‹participation›, Rowe and Frewer 
(2005) have proposed a typology of the different public engagement mech-
anisms. Dealing with a fuzzy literature in a blurry landscape, this prelimi-
nary though necessary endeavour has identified more than one hundred 
different methods! They first distinguish three broad categories of public 
engagement mechanisms.
The first category is of public communication: information is conveyed 
from the organiser or ‹sponsor›—usually a governmental or regulatory 
agency—to the public. The information flow is one-way: the public listens 
and gives no feedback on what is communicated. This category is of course 
very close to the Public Understanding of Science approach and can be 
compared to what Callon (1999) calls the model of public education (de 
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l’instruction publique). It draws together mechanisms such as TV broad-
casts, conferences, hotlines, web pages, leaflets, etc.
The second category is of public consultation: information is conveyed 
from members of the public back to the organiser of the initiative. In this 
situation, the sponsor is ‹listening› to the public and its opinion. This cat-
egory comprises mechanisms such as public hearings, surveys, focus 
groups, etc.
According to the authors, only the third category can be characterised as 
fair public participation: information is exchanged between members of 
the public and the organisers. This means that such devices involve a real 
dialogue between the parties, aiming at informing, as well as negotiating, 
and thus at changing the opinions and the framing of the issue at stake 
(Kaufmann et al. 2004). This category comprises mechanisms such as citi-
zens’ juries, citizens’ and consensus conferences, planning cells, decisional 
referenda, etc. It can be partly compared to what Callon (1999) has defined 
as the public debate model. Detailed presentations of the different methods 
and their use can be found in Gastil/ Levine 2005 and Joss/ Bellucci 2002.
However, a typology based on the theory of communication and proce-
dural criteria is incomplete without cross-examination against ‹dialogical› 
criteria. Scientific knowledge and technological innovation usually imply 
a double delegation of power: the delegation to political representatives to 
decide in the name of the citizenry, and, too often kept implicit, the delega-
tion to scientists, experts, and technologists, to find solutions (Callon/ Las-
coumes/ Barthe 2001). These two delegations can be put into question 
within hybrid forums, whatever the form: a public meeting, a consensus 
conference, or a public controversy at large. Hybrid forums are open spaces 
where mobilised groups can debate socio-technical choices which affect 
them. The groups are heterogeneous; they may include experts, elected 
representatives, technicians, activists, NGOs, and concerned laypersons. 
The questions at stake and the problems raised imply heterogeneous 
 knowledge and practices (id., p. 36). Note that hybrid forums emerge either 
spontaneously as public controversies or as organised procedures by stake-
holders or the authorities.
The most important change in the public sphere, often referred to as the 
‹deliberative or participatory turn›, is probably not just the direct participa-
tion of non-experts and citizens. This change cannot be understood, nor can 
it happen, without the other complementary reforms, namely greater trans-
parency in expertise, as opposed to the long time tradition of «confinement 
of expertise» (Callon/ Lascoumes/ Barthe 2001), and greater pluralism of 
the interests represented in expert commissions and decision-making pro-
cesses. In our view, participation and deliberation is directly linked to this 
reform of expertise and accountability.
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4. Science: a public good under assault
Historically, as mentioned above, scientific knowledge has emerged as a 
public good. For society to benefit from it, science had to be protected 
against private and selfish interests. Since the nineteenth century, a ‹social 
contract› has been established between science and society: scientists are 
granted extensive autonomy premised on the assumption that scientific 
knowledge allows industry and the market to develop useful innovations 
leading to increasing prosperity in return. The French historian of science 
Dominique Pestre has introduced the enlightening concept of Regime of 
science production and regulation (Pestre 2003). This is a very useful fra-
mework for investigating and describing the socio-historical transforma-
tions of the relationship between science and society since the scientific 
revolution.
The author insists on the fact that what is put under the umbrella of ‹sci-
ence› has not been a stable and clearly circumscribed object along history. 
Science, or more precisely ‹the sciences› are made up of a complex web of 
relations involving different kinds of productions (writings, results, tech-
niques), practices (instruments, calculations, simulations), values and 
norms (epistemological, ethical, behavioural), institutional realities (uni-
versities, engineering schools, laboratories, ‹start-ups›), modes of sociabil-
ity (‹salons› of the eighteenth century, amateur scientists, learned societ-
ies), economic and legal elements (technology transfer, intellectual 
property rights, financing modes), etc.
The fact that those elements combine in different ways along history is 
crucial; specific regimes can be identified for a given period of time. Ac-
cording to Pestre, a new regime has been established over the last three 
decades, namely, since about 1970, «we moved from a system of science in 
society dominated by an equilibrium between science as public good and 
science as industrial good to a system in which a financial and market-
oriented appropriation of scientific knowledge is now in the ascendant, to 
science as mainly a financial good. This mode of appropriation is both 
larger in what it includes and rooted in an aggressive extension of property 
rights […]» (Pestre 2005, p. 29)
This tendency has experienced a major impetus with the advent of mod-
ern biotechnology at the end of the 1970s, later followed by developments 
in genomics and the patenting of DNA sequences. This situation strongly 
impacts on the worldwide controversy about GM plants and their patented 
genetic constructions. For a majority of European public opinion, and this 
is true for several countries of the South as well, this technology, first pre-
sented as an emblem of ‹the green revolution› in agriculture, rapidly be-
came a market-driven innovation void of any benefit other than raising 
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large companies’ profits. The situation resembles that of the AIDS pan-
demic or orphan diseases like malaria in the South, which also triggered 
large social movements and raised criticism of pharmaceutical companies 
and their research and patenting policy. Accusations of biopiracy are made 
against companies exploring the South in quest of new molecules in plants 
or bacteria, or genes in populations affected by rare genetic diseases, in 
order to find potential treatments to cure the North. This practice has been 
considered by some as a new kind of colonialism: a scientific one.
Those controversies are key to the issue of scientific knowledge consid-
ered as a universal public good. Science can be threatened by private inter-
ests and may sometimes become a mere commodity to be exchanged on 
world markets.
5. Conclusion: science and democracy in a globalised world
I hope this short and somewhat simplistic journey from the scientific revo-
lution to the present offers a better idea of some of the major difficulties 
science has to face in order to contribute to the universal value of democra-
cy. Those challenges are tackled by authors like Bruno Latour and Isabelle 
Stengers at the philosophical and anthropological level. They are trying to 
develop new ways of thinking in order to imagine a «common world» (La-
tour 1999) or to found an «ecology of practices» (Stengers 2006) in which 
natural sciences, philosophy, sociology, politics and other worldviews like 
religion could coexist without disqualifying one another. This effort to find 
the adequate conditions and institutions for debating different ‹modes of 
existence› of human and non-human entities (molecules, viruses, plants, 
animals, atmosphere, oceans, mountains) can be viewed as a new kind of 
‹diplomacy› in search of the suitable institutions. Using Stengers’s poetical 
book title, one can ask: how can we design a society in which theological 
knowledge and social practices necessary to allow the Virgin Mary to 
 appear to pilgrims can peacefully coexist with the ethos, instruments and 
theo ries required to make the neutrino become visible to physicists?
As noticed by Stengers, it is not easy to accommodate the ‹universal› 
claims of science to other kinds of worldviews and local practices, since 
science presents itself with the following triple-identity: «as the drive for 
human progress, as the direct and anonymous translation of a definitely 
rational knowledge production mode, and as the fabric of something that 
cannot avoid opposing opinions, inertia, habits and traditional values» 
(Stengers 2006, p. 112). I think that public participation in science and 
technology or co-production of knowledge can contribute to making sci-
ence and technology open up to the realm of democracy (Bourg/ Kaufmann 
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2007). In my view, democracy represents a universal value to which sci-
ence must contribute by engaging with laypeople, local communities and 
concerned groups. The European project Citizen Participation in Science 
and Technology (CIPAST), in which my department is involved as the 
Swiss partner, is an interesting effort to disseminate participatory proce-
dures throughout Europe and beyond. It aims at building an international 
network of experts and providing capacity building support to universities, 
public agencies, NGOs, museums or private companies who want to im-
plement participation in their specific contexts.5
Of course, this is not an easy task and we must not be naïve about the 
virtues of public engagement with science, be it participation or knowledge 
co-production. As Pestre says, echoing Beck, «decision-making in market 
democracies depends on a far greater variety of logics than debate and 
expertise alone. […] The sphere of the political is perhaps not so central to 
decision-making because decisions of major importance, in social and en-
vironmental terms, are constantly taken ‹on markets›. […] The main actors 
of the world economy today constitute a meta-power largely dissociated 
from the sphere of the political. Their strength resides in their capacity to 
do things, to invest where they deem appropriate, and to pull out of any 
country that contests their approach.» (Pestre 2005, pp. 49–50)
5.1. Political ecology as a new universalism?
The emergence of the environmental crisis and the threat it represents to the 
future of humankind and the market economy implies a radical shift in per-
spective on the relations between science and society. The advent of the 
precautionary principle and the necessity to deal with increasing uncertain-
ties, be they scientific, social or ethical, offer a unique opportunity to nego-
tiate a new contract between scientific knowledge and universal values. 
Franklin, Lury, and Stacey, analysing the anthropological impact of the pho-
tograph of our planet taken by Apollo at the end of the 1960s, show that it 
represents the dawn of an emergent universalism they call panhumanity:
Panhumanity is united not only by a shared human nature, or family tree, but by a 
shared culture, composed of images such as the blue planet which convey a sense of 
vulnerability and risk. The image of the blue planet is thus both a transformative image 
in its own right, and an icon of an era defined by the «altered consciousness» of the 
panoptical, heavenly gaze which captures the planet as glowing blue orb. […] Panhu-
manity is thus defined by a mixture of pride in technological achievement and simul-
taneous appreciation of its associated risk. […] The counter-icon to the blue planet that 
has shaped postwar consciousness is the image of the huge mushroom-cloud explo-
sion of the Hiroshima bomb—the atomic threat that could destroy humanity on a 
global scale.
Franklin et al. 2000, pp. 30–31
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This small place, lost in space, can be seen as a metaphorical hybrid fo-
rum, made of human and non-human entities, in need of a global political 
ecology with the appropriate tools and institutions, which are imagined in 
their complexities in the current work of Bruno Latour (1999).
5.2. Academics and the new universalism: linking universities to civil 
 society
Even if the scientific ethos has emerged as the dominant form of universa-
lity in the modern world, it is time for academics to realise that the validity 
of a paternalistic vision like the Public Understanding of Science is no 
longer defensible. This kind of approach tends to disqualify laypeople and 
their local knowledge, and to introduce artificial distinctions between facts 
and values, science and opinion. The initial social contract between science 
and society, safeguarding the autonomy of the scientific community in di-
stance to the people, must now be re-assessed. The growing incentives 
provided to universities to seek funding from industry could endanger this 
independence and ‹the commons› produced by public research institutions. 
Incentives should also be provided for research bodies to co-operate with 
local communities, citizens, and NGOs. That means that part of the re-
search budget from universities should be devoted to investigating topics 
stemming from social demand. Building such partnerships and links with 
civil society could be a crucial resource for academics to maintain their 
beloved autonomy and independence from purely market-oriented re-
search.
At the University of Lausanne, for example, we have launched a new 
project called «Living Together in Uncertainty» («Vivre Ensemble dans 
l’Incertain») in 2007. We have conducted an inquiry among the people of 
our region—the Canton de Vaud—using in-depth interviews and focus 
groups in order to document their visions of the future and the role their 
university could play. The results have been discussed and further elabo-
rated in a forum composed of about sixty people representing most sectors 
of the society: politics, science, religion, culture, sports, industry and the 
media.6 On this basis, we will identify themes for new research projects, 
which will be conducted in the years to come, in partnership with local 
concerned groups and other actors. Like the science-shop movement, this 
kind of endeavour certainly represents a kind of ‹cultural revolution› for 
the academic world. Yet my bet is that besides the criteria of excellence and 
competitiveness, this trend could progressively become an important en-
deavour of universities, in order to ensure a sustainable future for public 
research, its credibility and independence.
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Notes
∗ French quotes have been translated by the author.
1 See http://www.ta-swiss.ch.
2 See http://www.cipast.org.
3 See http://www.unil.ch/interface.
4 In order to avoid any anachronism, I use the term «science». But the reader ought to bear 
in mind that, in doing so, I will often also refer to technology, or what is called «techno-
science». This is especially true today, science and technology being so much intercon-
nected. According to the usual practice of English, I will most often use the word  «science» 
in its singular form. But the reader has to be aware that I am talking about «the sciences», 
in their diversity, in terms of practices and worldviews.
5 All information about the project, a database of participatory processes and the training 
tools (case studies in various scientific and technological domains, background docu-
ments) are available on http://www.cipast.org.
6 Detailed information about the project and all the reports can be downloaded at 
http://www.unil.ch/vei.
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